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Negotiating	Single	Market	access	with	the	EU:
institutional	lessons	from	Switzerland
Switzerland	is	in	the	midst	of	negotiating	an	institutional	framework	for	some	of
its	more	important	bilateral	agreements	with	the	EU.	Laura	Knöpfel	(King’s
College	London)	and	Cenni	Najy	(University	of	Geneva)	look	at	what
institutional	lessons	can	be	learned	for	the	UK	as	it	tries	to	leave	the	EU	while
remaining	partly	in	the	Single	Market.
Chapter	4	of	the	Chequers	policy	paper	proposes	the	conclusion	of	several
bilateral	agreements	with	the	EU.	After	the	UK’s	departure	from	the	union,	those	agreements	should	allow	the	UK	to
retain	some	access	to	the	Single	Market,	mainly	for	goods.	The	paper	envisages	the	creation	of	a	horizontal
institutional	arrangement	that	would	cover	the	majority	of	the	post-Brexit	agreements.	It	also	foresees	that	disputes
about	the	interpretation	of	a	provision	of	a	common	rulebook	might	arise.	In	such	cases,	the	UK	concedes	that	the
Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU)	should	play	a	role	in	the	settlement	of	disputes.
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The	UK	is	not	the	only	third	country	that	is	currently	deliberating	a	horizontal	institutional	framework	to	embed
bilateral	relationships.	For	more	than	four	years,	the	EU	has	been	negotiating	the	institutional	dimension	for	some	of
its	existing	sectoral	agreements	with	Switzerland.	The	institutional	dimension	should	include	a	legally	binding	dispute
settlement	mechanism.
Admittedly,	the	Swiss	and	British	situations	differ	on	a	very	fundamental	level.	Whilst	one	country	is	seeking	a	closer
relationship	with	the	EU	the	other	one	is	trying	to	leave	it	in	an	orderly	fashion.	Nevertheless,	the	Swiss	experience
might	offer	some	valuable	insights.	Indeed,	both	countries	seek	continued	access	to	the	Single	Market	whilst
positioning	themselves	outside	of	the	EU.
Only	in	2008	and	almost	ten	years	after	the	conclusion	of	the	first	set	of	sectoral	agreements	(Bilaterals	I),	the
“institutional	question”	between	Switzerland	and	the	EU	emerged.	For	the	European	Council,	the	loose	institutional
setting	of	these	agreements	had	hampered	the	development	of	legal	homogeneity	within	the	Internal	Market.	Initially,
the	Swiss	were	sceptical.	The	country	has	been	compliant	with	its	obligations	and	disputes	were	few.	Moreover,	the
Swiss	government	feared	a	loss	of	sovereignty	through,	for	example,	an	increased	role	for	the	CJEU.	Yet	it	began	to
address	the	issue	–	not	voluntarily,	but	because	the	EU	had	decided	not	to	conclude	any	new	market	access
agreements	without	an	institutional	arrangement.
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Since	May	2014,	Switzerland	and	the	EU	have	been	negotiating	an	institutional	agreement	which	should	cover
some,	but	by	no	means	all,	of	the	120	bilateral	treaties	currently	in	force	between	the	parties.	The	negotiations	have
been	long	and	frustrating.	One	reason	for	the	difficulty	has	been	the	inability	of	the	parties	to	agree	on	a	new	dispute
settlement	mechanism.	To	date,	agreement-specific	Joint	Committees	–	diplomatic	bodies	–	have	had	the	exclusive
competence	of	resolving	disputes.	Disagreements	occurred	and	the	issues	that	had	been	raised	in	front	of	the	Joint
Committees	could	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases	be	resolved	through	low-key	back-channel	diplomatic	negotiations.
But	the	EU	has	made	clear	that	it	intends	to	relocate	the	resolution	of	disagreements	from	the	diplomatic	into	the
legal	sphere.	For	Switzerland,	it	was	out	of	the	question	that	a	judicial	body	of	the	EU	could	be	the	only	competent
body	to	decide	on	a	dispute.
In	late	2017,	both	parties	expressed	their	willingness	to	find	a	compromise	in	the	form	of	an	arbitration	panel.	The
panel	would	be	ad-hoc	and	the	arbitrators’	competences	far-reaching.	However,	the	compromise	did	not	settle	the
issue.	The	EU	accepted	an	arbitration	solution	provided	that	the	CJEU	would	be	competent	to	issue	an	interpretative
ruling	on	disputed	provisions	that	contain	EU	law.	Considering	the	bilateral	treaties	entanglements	with	EU	law,
Switzerland	has	disagreed.	But	the	Swiss	government	conceded	that	the	CJEU	might	be	asked	to	interpret	disputed
treaty	provisions	which	contain	core	EU	law.	Provisions	that	are	not	defined	in	relation	to	EU	law	would	be
interpreted	by	the	arbitration	panel,	bindingly	and	solely.	Currently,	Switzerland	and	the	EU	are	trying	to	find	common
ground	on	what	ought	to	be	considered	as	EU	law.
In	a	recent	policy	brief	for	the	Swiss	foreign	policy	think	tank	Foraus,	we	analysed	the	provisions	of	the	bilateral
agreements	and	came	to	the	conclusion	that	they	could	be	classified	into	three	different	types:	1)	treaty	provisions
defined	by	explicit	reference	to	EU	law,	2)	treaty	provisions	that	are	identical	in	substance	to	EU	law	and	3)	treaty
provisions	that	include	so-called	“concepts”	of	EU	law.
Accordingly,	we	proposed	adjusting	a	binding	settlement	mechanism	according	to	the	degree	of	a	provision’s
closeness	to	EU	law.	If	a	provision	is	defined	by	reference	to	EU	law	or	is	identical	in	substance,	the	envisaged
arbitration	panel	must	refer	the	dispute	to	the	CJEU.	The	interpretation	provided	by	the	CJEU	judges	is	then	binding
on	the	arbitration	panel.	If,	however,	the	interpretative	divergences	concern	a	concept	of	EU	law,	an	arbitration	panel
can	–	but	is	under	no	obligation	to	–	refer	the	dispute	to	the	CJEU.	In	both	instances,	the	CJEU’s	decision	is	only
binding	upon	the	arbitration	panel	which	then	takes	the	ultimate	decision	on	the	whole	dispute.	Such	a	dispute
solving	mechanism	represents	a	compromise	between	the	Swiss	and	the	EU	positions.	It	is,	however,	not	a	legally
neat	solution.	Rather,	it	reflects	the	Swiss	way	of	“muddling	through”	which	has	characterised	the	country’s
relationship	with	the	EU	since	the	1990s.
Arguably,	Swiss	bilateral	integration	is	the	result	of	peculiar	circumstances	and	is	therefore	unique.	Nonetheless,	we
believe	that	the	Swiss	experience	has	some	value	for	the	UK.	There	are	at	least	three	lessons	to	be	learned	from	the
late	Swiss-EU	institutional	tale:
Maintaining	legal	homogeneity	within	the	Single	Market	has	become	a	stated	aim	for	the	EU,	in	particular	in
regard	to	third	countries	that	participate	in	the	Single	Market.	Therefore,	the	conclusion	of	new	market	access
agreements	without	an	institutional	agreement	seems	very	unlikely.
As	part	of	an	institutional	framework,	the	EU	wants	to	locate	the	resolution	of	disputes	in	the	legal	and	not	in
the	political	or	diplomatic	sphere,	as	was	previously	the	case	with	Switzerland.
The	EU	might	accept	the	appointment	of	an	ad	hoc	arbitration	panel	to	solve	disputes	in	last	instance.
However,	the	CJEU	will	most	likely	play	a	significant	role	as	the	sole	interpreter	of	disputed	provisions	that	are
closely	defined	in	relation	to	EU	law.	It	remains	to	be	seen	what	provisions	will	be	considered	as	EU	law	(and
therefore	having	to	be	interpreted	by	the	CJEU	in	case	of	dispute).	The	result	of	the	Swiss-EU	negotiations	will
be	an	important	indicator	of	EU’s	flexibility	in	that	regard.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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